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5Public policy shapes the lives of individuals, and even more so if 
they depend on state support. But to what extent can well-being 
differences between individuals living in different European states 
be traced back to the specific national public policy designs? This 
paper tests the intervening effects of the design and generosity of 
labour market policy on the life satisfaction of the unemployed. To 
estimate cross-level interaction effects in random intercept mod-
els, macro-indicators on active labour market policy spending and 
unemployment benefit generosity of 21 European countries are 
merged with survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS). 
While unemployment has strong negative life satisfaction effects 
all over Europe, the generosity of passive labour market policy 
moderates this effect to a surprisingly large extent: The adverse 
effect of unemployment is almost doubled in a country with meagre 
unemployment benefits. This moderating effect can be explained 
both by a resource as well as a non-pecuniary mechanism. In con-
trast, the moderating effect of active labour market policy is less 
robust across model specifications.
keywords: 
Labor market policy, welfare state, unemployment, life satisfaction, 
subjective well-being, unemployment benefits
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Das Leben aller Bürger wird durch die Ausgestaltung des 
Wohlfahrtsstaats gerahmt und dies gilt in besonderem Maße 
für diejenigen, die auf Unterstützung durch den Sozialstaat an-
gewiesen sind. Doch inwiefern lassen sich die Unterschiede im 
subjektiven Wohlbefinden von europäischen Arbeitslosen durch 
die nationale Ausgestaltung der Arbeitsmarktpolitik erklären? 
Dieses Paper untersucht den moderierenden Einfluss der Gen-
erosität und des Designs aktiver und passiver Arbeitsmarktpo-
litik auf die Lebenszufriedenheit der betroffenen Arbeitslosen. 
Hierzu werden die Umfragedaten von 4 Wellen des European 
Social Surveys gemeinsam mit arbeitsmarkpolitischen Mak-
rodaten in einer Mehrebenenanalyse untersucht. Während sich 
der negative Lebenszufriedenheitseffekt von Arbeitslosigkeit 
in allen Ländern bestätigt, zeigt sich ein überraschend starker 
moderierender Effekt der Generosität der Arbeitslosenunter-
stützung: Der nachteilige Effekt von Arbeitslosigkeit verdoppelt 
sich in Ländern mit eingeschränkten Leistungen im Vergleich zu 
großzügigeren Ländern beinahe. Hierbei finden sich Hinweise 
auf nichtpekuniäre sowie Ressourcenmechanismen. Der positive 
moderierende Effekt der aktiven Arbeitsmarktpolitik stellt sich 
hingegen als deutlich weniger robust dar.
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Public policy shapes the lives of inhabit-
ants of a country in intended and unin-
tended ways, and this statement holds 
even more for groups whose everyday life 
depends heavily on state support. Indis-
putably, the life of the unemployed is af-
fected more by welfare state design than 
the life of average employees, with labour 
market policy having the largest impact. 
The level of unemployment benefits 
largely determines the financial situation 
of the unemployed. Furthermore, strict 
eligibility rules and short benefit dura-
tions may translate into dependence on 
means-tested social assistance benefits 
or family transfers and an increased risk 
of unemployment to be stigmatic. In ad-
dition to these monetary transfers that af-
fect the unemployed, active labour market 
policy (ALPM) plays an increasingly im-
portant role in most European countries. 
Various measures of ALMP such as job 
search assistance, training programmes, 
employment subsidies and work crea-
tion schemes shape the lives of the un-
employed. But how does labour market 
policy affect the subjective well-being of 
the unemployed?
Policy evaluations have analysed the 
effects of both active and passive labour 
intensely, but this research is narrowly 
focussed on objective outcomes such as 
employment, unemployment and wages. 
The effect of labour market policy on 
subjective well-being has only recently 
gained attention (Helliwell & Huang 2011; 
Ochsen & Welsch 2012; Di Tella et al. 
2003), despite the vast literature proofing 
the harmful life satisfaction effects of un-
employment. Given that many economists 
demand subjective well-being to substi-
tute or complement pecuniary indicators 
in the measurement of social welfare (e.g. 
Layard 2011; Easterlin 1974; Ng 1997; 
Oswald 1997), this lack of policy evalua-
tion comes as a surprise. For policymak-
ers, the well-being of the unemployed 
matters for two distinct reasons: Firstly, 
low levels of subjective well-being among 
the unemployed are likely to affect job 
search behaviour, although the sign of the 
effect is unclear. Whereas Mavridis (2010; 
see also Clark 2003) finds individuals that 
suffer from larger drops in life satisfaction 
after job loss to have shorter unemploy-
ment durations, Anderson (2009: 348; see 
also Waters & Moore 2002; Korpi 1997) 
argues that low life satisfaction may trans-
late into “discouragement, lower levels 
of skill acquisition, inferior performance 
in job interviews, and eventually a lower 
probability of job offers and successful job 
searches”. Secondly, improving the well-
being of the socially disadvantaged in so-
ciety is a core task of the welfare state. 
Accordingly, the EU has stressed the im-
portance of social cohesion and inclusion 
in their growth strategy for the coming 
decade, Europe 20201. 
While a general ‘activation turn’ to-
wards lower unemployment benefit levels 
and a stronger focus on ALMP has taken 
place in many modern welfare states, Eu-
1 See http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.
jsp?catId=751&langId=en
1. Introduction
9ropean countries differ considerably in 
their labour market policy design. But do 
these national differences in labour mar-
ket policy trajectories influence life satis-
faction of the jobless? 
To evaluate the social welfare implica-
tions of labour market policy, this paper 
applies a multilevel research design. Data 
on labour market policy provision at the 
country level is merged with internation-
ally comparable micro-level data. Survey 
data from four waves of the European 
Social Survey (ESS) is assembled for 21 
European countries to be able to analyse 
and control for individual characteristics 
of respondents. This micro data is merged 
with macro-level data concerning labour 
market policy indicators and other control 
variables such as the unemployment rate. 
It is tested whether the design and gener-
osity of the welfare state interacts with the 
effect of unemployment on life satisfac-
tion. Specifically, the paper focuses on the 
question whether unemployment benefit 
generosity and a country’s commitment to 
ALMP mitigate the life satisfaction effect 
of unemployment. The empirical analysis 
shows that generous passive labour mar-
ket policy moderates the negative life sat-
isfaction effect of unemployment to an im-
pressive extent, while the effects of ALMP 
turn out to be far less robust. I argue that 
the generosity of unemployment benefits 
affects life satisfaction of the unemployed 
through two mechanisms: In addition to 
an obvious resource mechanism, labour 
market policy also affects life satisfaction 
through a non-pecuniary mechanism that 
is linked to stigmatization and the position 
of the unemployed in society.
The paper is structured as follows: 
First the developments of European la-
bour market policy covering benefit gen-
erosity and the emergence of active and 
activating labour market policy within the 
last decades are portrayed. The following 
section provides an overview over the ef-
fect of unemployment on well-being, with 
a special focus on the intervening effect 
of the welfare state in general, and labour 
market policy in particular. After the de-
scription of methodology and data with 
the depiction of descriptive statistics, the 
results of the multi-level analyses are pre-
sented and discussed. Finally, the conclu-
sion completes the paper.
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2. Labour Market Policy, Unemployment and 
Life Satisfaction
ThE ‘ACTIvATIon TURn’ In 
EURoPEAn LAboUR MARkET 
PoLICy
After a short interlude of nearly full em-
ployment in the post-World War II period, 
unemployment has evolved to be one of 
the most pressing social, economic and 
political problems of modern market 
economies, constituting “a profoundly 
distressing experience that produces con-
siderable individual costs and important 
political consequences” (Anderson 2009: 
343). As a reaction to recurrent waves 
of mass unemployment in general, and 
the disturbing expansion of long-term 
unemployment in specific, criticism con-
cerning inflexible labour markets and 
discouraging welfare state design has 
risen in the 1990s. Generous unemploy-
ment insurance schemes have been ac-
cused of raising the reservation wage of 
the unemployed and thus disincentivising 
job search and employment. Even though 
crossnational comparisons analysing the 
connection between unemployment ben-
efits and national unemployment rates 
are rather contradictory in their findings 
(cf. Sjöberg et al. 2010: 429-430), labour 
market policy has been subject to para-
digmatic changes. 
European policy makers have re-
formed their labour market policy design 
heavily over the past decades, with acti-
vation becoming a central component of 
modern welfare states. Broadly speak-
ing, this ‘activation turn’ is composed of 
at least two components: Firstly, active 
labour market policy has gained in impor-
tance, with many countries expanding on 
training measures, job search assistance 
and employment subsidies. Secondly, re-
forms have tended to be restrictive con-
cerning passive labour market policy: 
“Eligibility criteria have been tightened, 
benefit levels have been reduced, benefits 
have been made conditional on employ-
ment, and the duration of receipt has 
been shortened” (Kenworthy 2010: 438). 
The core idea of the activation paradigm 
is the explicit linkage of welfare benefits 
to behavioural expectations towards ben-
efit recipients, increasing the pressure 
on the unemployed to search for jobs 
through conditionality and less generous 
unemployment benefits (Fromm & Sproß 
2008: 10). While the specific pattern of 
policy change differs quite considerably 
between European welfare states, it is 
fair to speak of a general shift from pas-
sive towards active (and activating) labour 
market policy. 
The effects of this policy shift have 
been analysed with respect to outcomes 
such as employment, unemployment and 
income, with micro-level studies being 
somewhat more optimistic than macro-
level evaluations (Bonoli 2010: 450). This 
discrepancy between micro-level and 
macro-level analyses might well be due 
to substitution effects between partici-
pants and non-participants of e.g. train-
11
ing schemes, yet proofing these effects is 
methodologically more than challenging.
WELL-bEIng EffECTS of 
UnEMPLoyMEnT AnD ThE 
InTERvEnIng EffECT of 
LAboUR MARkET PoLICy
Evaluations of labour market policies gen-
erally ignore the fact that unemployment 
is connected to more than just strictly 
financial consequences. Amartya Sen 
(1997: 160) argues that these “negative 
effects are cumulative, and they act indi-
vidually and jointly to undermine and sub-
vert personal and social life. The need to 
distinguish between the different ways in 
which joblessness causes problems is im-
portant not only for a better understand-
ing of the nature and effects of unemploy-
ment, but also for devising an appropriate 
policy response”. 
These psychosocial effects of unem-
ployment have first been described by 
Jahoda et al. (1933) and indeed received 
a high level of attention in the happiness 
and well-being literature of the past two 
decades. In her theory, Jahoda (1982: 59) 
argues that the unemployed are deprived 
of five essential experience categories of 
work: (1) imposition of a time structure, 
(2) social contacts, (3) participation in a 
collective purpose, (4) status and iden-
tity and (5) required regular activity. 
Furthermore, Fryer (1986) stresses the 
importance of agency and control in the 
connection between unemployment and 
well-being. Unemployment prevents the 
individual from being economically self-
sufficient and restricts the control over 
the own life course.
Due to these psychosocial factors, a 
detrimental life satisfaction effect of un-
employment has consistently been found 
across countries, time and research de-
signs. Even after controlling for income, 
time-consistent personality traits and 
other socio-economic preconditions, the 
lack of paid employment causes a consid-
erable drop in the well-being of affected 
individuals. This connection between un-
employment and life satisfaction is firmly 
established in the theoretical and empiri-
cal literature (e.g. Winkelmann & Winkel-
mann 1998; Clark & Oswald 1994; Gerlach 
& Stephan 1996; Khattab & Fenton 2009; 
Van Praag & Ferreri-Carbonell 2002; Car-
roll 2007). Next to these non-pecuniary 
effects, unemployment is also connected 
to a drop in income. According to the 
Easterlin paradox, happiness within coun-
tries depends strongly on an individual’s 
income and wealth, whereas there is no 
such positive correlation to be found if 
average well-being and economic growth 
are analysed at the macro-level (Easterlin 
1974; see also Oswald 1997). As individ-
ual unemployment is strongly correlated 
to a lower relative income in comparison 
to the national average, financial hardship 
amongst the unemployed is connected to 
high psychological distress (Gallie & Rus-
sell 1998: 269), so that both non-pecuni-
ary and pecuniary factors cause the life 
satisfaction to fall. 
Several scholars have called for gov-
ernments to take well-being effects into 
account in their policy design (e.g. Layard 
2011; Carroll 2007; Clark & Oswald 1994; 
Sen 1997). To do so, the intervening ef-
fect of policies needs to be understood 
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first. Yet the extensive literature on well-
being effects of unemployment on the one 
hand and labour market policy evaluation 
on the other hand has largely ignored 
the call to connect both research areas, 
and prematurely so. The few studies that 
analyse the intervening effect of labour 
market policy reach contradictory conclu-
sions. Di Tella et al. (2003) find a positive 
effect of unemployment benefit replace-
ment rates on average life satisfaction in 
twelve European nations between 1975 
and 1992, while they do not find evidence 
for an interaction effect between benefit 
generosity and individual unemployment. 
These results are in line with the findings 
of Gallie and Russell (1998) for eleven 
European countries. Helliwell and Huang 
(2011) even show a slightly negative inter-
action effect of unemployment benefit re-
placement rates and unemployment in US 
states. They explain this counterintuitive 
result with potential endogeneity in policy 
making: States in which unemployment is 
perceived to be especially harsh may be 
more generous in their benefits. In con-
trast to these results, Ochsen and Welsch 
(2012) find quite pronounced effects of 
labour market institutions on the life sat-
isfaction of average citizens and an even 
higher effect of benefit levels on the un-
employed in ten European countries be-
tween 1975 and 2002. Ochsen and Welsch 
distinguish between short-term and long-
term replacement rates to account for lev-
els as well as duration of unemployment 
benefits. In their results, short-term ben-
efits affect the well-being of unemployed 
more than long-term benefits. In general, 
the effect of unemployment benefit gen-
erosity on subjective well-being seems to 
be larger in studies that analyse European 
data rather than US data and use a more 
comprehensive measure of generosity 
than merely average replacement rates, 
covering additional features such as the 
duration of benefit entitlement.
Despite these mixed results in the 
existing literature, the hypotheses in this 
paper expect the welfare state in general 
and labour market policy in specific to 
have a considerable impact on the well-
being of the unemployed, as their living 
standards are highly dependent on state 
support. I argue that generosity of pas-
sive labour market policy may affect the 
unemployed through two mechanisms. 
The first mechanism is strictly tied to the 
resource dimension of financial hardship, 
that is, generous unemployment ben-
efits enable the unemployed to consume 
goods that yield utility. The second fac-
tor is closely connected to the statement 
that policymakers implicitly or explicitly 
make about the status and identity of the 
unemployed in society by implementing a 
certain labour market policy. For instance, 
low generosity of insurance based unem-
ployment benefits and a higher reliance 
on means-tested social assistance ben-
efits increase the risk that unemployment 
will be stigmatic (Gallie & Paugam 2000: 
4). Also, short durations and higher condi-
tionality of benefits can be expected to be 
connected to high levels of psychological 
stress that go beyond the lack of financial 
resources that it might imply. 
I expect both the pecuniary and the 
non-pecuniary aspects of passive labour 
market policy to lead to a moderating ef-
fect of unemployment benefit generosity 
on the life satisfaction of the unemployed. 
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Hypothesis 1 thus expects unemployed in 
a country with generous passive labour 
market policy to experience a smaller 
drop in well-being than unemployed in 
countries with meagre benefits and short 
benefit duration.
The influence of labour market policy 
on the lives of the unemployed is not lim-
ited to monetary transfers, though. As 
described above, activation consists of a 
combination of both passive and active 
labour market policies. Hence, the every-
day lives of the unemployed are shaped 
by job search assistance, training meas-
ures, work creation schemes and other 
ALMP measures that are likely to have an 
impact on well-being. Micro-level studies 
in Sweden, Germany and the UK have in-
deed pointed towards an increase in the 
well-being of the unemployed that are 
currently participating in certain active la-
bour market schemes (Wulfgramm 2011; 
Andersen 2008; Strandh 2001). Moreover, 
Anderson (2009) conducted a multi-level 
analysis on the impact of ALMP on so-
cial ties in Europe and shows that labour 
market outsiders in countries with higher 
spending on ALMP tend to have a higher 
sense of social inclusion and report more 
frequent social interaction. 
Applying Jahodas deprivation theory 
to the participation in ALMP measures I 
argue that government training and occu-
pational schemes can fulfil certain psycho-
social functions of work and should thus 
have a positive effect on the life satisfac-
tion of the unemployed. ALMP schemes 
offer opportunities for social contacts, are 
subject to a clear time structure and may 
even convey the feeling of participating 
in a useful collective purpose. Moreover, 
skill acquisition should enhance the feel-
ing of control over one’s life. It should be 
kept in mind that not all ALMP spending is 
alike in its design and intentions, though. 
For instance, work creation schemes can 
have a strong enforcing character (Ding-
eldey 2007) and participation may not be 
voluntary. 
Hypothesis 2 expects ALMP to have 
a positive moderating effect on the life 
satisfaction of unemployment. However, 
the expected effect of ALMP is far more 
ambiguous than the expected effect of 
benefits and the effect of European ALMP 
spending thus needs to be tested empiri-
cally. The two core hypotheses of this pa-
per will be tested by applying a multi-level 
design to survey data as well as macro-
level data, as described in the following 
sections.
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3. Methodology and Model Specification
As data is sampled from both the mi-
cro- and the macro-level, the regression 
analysis needs to account for the specific-
ity of such a clustered design. In a nested 
data structure, that is, individual survey 
responses are nested within countries, 
the influence of the contextual variables 
would be greatly biased towards high 
significance levels if the analysis treats 
all lower-level observations as independ-
ent (cf. Hox 2010: 3). To avoid spuriously 
significant results, the biased error terms 
need to be adjusted for the dependence of 
lower-level observations within clusters. 
The largely biased standard errors are 
adjusted introducing random intercepts 
into the empirical analysis. This con-
trols for the high intra-cluster correlation 
(ICC=0.13 in the null-model) between ob-
servations measured on respondents from 
the same country. Therefore, the models 
tested in this paper have the following 
general design:
The endogenous variable life satisfac-
tion LS of individual i in country j is a func-
tion of the vector of p level 1 explanatory 
variables Xpij as well as q level 2 explana-
tory variables Zqj. In contrast to regular 
regression models with independent ob-
servations, the error term is split into two 
error components: µ0j picks up the level 
2 error term and is thus depicting error 
patterns at the country level, while      is 
the level 1 error term that applies to each 
respondent individually. 
The main level 1 variable of interest is 
current unemployment of the respondent, 
as compared to employment, retirement, 
military or civil service, housework, being 
permanently sick or disabled and being 
a student as the main activity during the 
last 7 days. In addition, vector X consists 
of control variables at the individual level. 
These include gender, living with a part-
ner, subjective health, age, age squared, 
years of formal education, household in-
come and a dummy variable for living in 
a household with unemployment benefits 
as the major source of income. Vector Z 
contains macro variables concerning so-
cial and labour market policy. As the main 
exogenous variables, unemployment ben-
efit generosity (see operationalisation in 
the data section) and expenditure on ac-
tive labour market policy per unemployed 
as a percentage of gdp per capita are ana-
lysed. In addition, control variables on the 
country level are included in the models. 
These level 2 control variables are the 
natural logarithm of gdp per capita, public 
social expenditure as a percentage of gdp 
as well as the unemployment rate.
The key research question in this pa-
per does not cover the distinctive effects 
of micro-level and macro-level exogenous 
variables on life satisfaction, though. The 
main focus lies on testing the moderating 
effect of macro-level variables on the effect 
of an individual’s unemployment on life 
satisfaction. Therefore, cross-level inter-
action effects of specific policy indicators 
with individual unemployment ßpqZqjXpij 
are inserted into the model specifications:
ij 
LSij = ß00 + ßp0Xpij + ß0qZqj + μ0j + ij . 
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As the research question and core 
hypotheses suggest, two interaction ef-
fects are of special interest for this pa-
per. Firstly, the moderating influence 
of passive labour market policy on the 
life satisfaction effect of unemploy-
ment is tested with the interaction term 
unemployment*unemployment benefit 
generosity. The second moderating in-
fluence of interest is the interaction 
term unemployment*ALMP expendi-
ture per unemployed as a percentage of 
gdp. Furthermore, an interaction term 
unemployment*unemployment rate is 
included to control for a potential social 
norm effect of high unemployment (Clark 
2003).
As this paper relies on comparisons 
in life satisfaction responses across coun-
tries, criticism may arise concerning cul-
tural or linguistic biases in the answering 
of well-being surveys. Despite studies 
that have shown these general concerns 
to be exaggerated (Bolle & Kemp 2009), it 
might still be argued that the effect of un-
employment in a country is mainly driven 
by country-specific constant characteris-
tics, such as work ethics and that these 
characteristics are correlated to policy 
differences between countries. This might 
lead to endogeneity problems. Therefore, 
a model that includes country-fixed ef-
fects is calculated, with clustered stand-
ard errors at the country level. It should 
be noted that most of the variance occurs 
between countries rather than within 
countries, though, so that the major focus 
should remain on the random intercept 
model. This becomes especially obvious 
in the benefit generosity indicator, with 
an average within-country standard devi-
ation of 2 as compared to an overall stand-
ard deviation of 19.1 (see table 2). Howev-
er, a model with country fixed effects may 
serve as a robustness test. One further 
concern might be the argument that the 
life satisfaction scale from 0-10 is merely 
an ordinal representation of an underlying 
latent variable, implying an ordered logis-
tic or probit estimation. However, in hap-
piness economics, this concern has been 
proven to be mainly of theoretical nature 
with little empirical implications, while it 
inhibits the interpretation of coefficients. 
In line with the findings of Ferreri-Car-
bonell and Frijters (2004), I refrain from 
treating the dependent variable as being 
merely ordinal.
 
LSij = ß00 + ßp0Xpij + ß0qZqj + ßpqZqjXpij + μ0j + ij . 
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4. Data: Merging Macro-Data with the European 
Social Survey
To test the hypotheses in the multi-level 
framework of this paper, two different 
kinds of data are assembled. To differen-
tiate between the effects of aggregated 
national economic conditions as well as 
policies on the one hand and the effects of 
individual socioeconomic characteristics 
on the other hand, both micro-level and 
macro-level data are merged. Table 1 (p. 
17) summarizes the main features of the 
micro-level dataset as well as macro-lev-
el control variables, while table 2 shows 
descriptive statistics of the explanatory 
macro-level variables by country.
On the micro-level, survey data from 
the European Social Survey (ESS) covers 
the dependent variable Life Satisfaction 
as well as exogenous variables that pro-
vide information about individual charac-
teristics of respondents. 
The data for this study is compiled of 
the first four waves of the survey for a to-
tal of 21 countries, with 16 to 20 countries 
that are included in the integrated dataset 
per wave: Austria, Belgium, Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Swit-
zerland and UK. The interview periods 
of wave 1-4 are 2002/2003, 2004/2005, 
2006/2007 and 2008/2009.
As the research questions aim at ana-
lysing the effect of unemployment and 
labour market policy on the unemployed, 
the focus is limited to respondents at 
working age. Therefore, only respondents 
at the age of 15 to 64 remain in the data-
set. Given this selection of cases, between 
863 and 2309 respondents per country 
and wave are included, yielding a total of 
107,983 level 1 observations.
To measure the dependent variable in 
this paper, i.e. life satisfaction, the follow-
ing question was asked in the respective 
local language: 
“All things considered, how satisfied 
are you with your life as a whole nowa-
days? Please answer using this card, where 
0 means extremely dissatisfied and 10 
means extremely satisfied.”
Merging data from different waves 
of the ESS poses problems concerning 
the availability of micro-level variables. 
While most questions of interest have 
been asked identically in all waves of the 
ESS, some variables have been changed 
or excluded in certain waves. The most 
striking deviation applies to the meas-
urement of the household income of re-
spondents. In wave 1-3, the income vari-
able codes all countries according to the 
same 12 income categories. In contrast, 
the income variable in wave 4 is based on 
showcards depicting the country-specific 
income deciles. Therefore the categories 
differ widely between countries. Thus, 
while wave 1-3 give information about the 
absolute income, wave 4 gives informa-
tion on the relative income compared to 
the level within a country. An integration 
of both income measures would be highly 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean 
Standard  
Deviation 
Level 1 Variables:    
Life Satisfaction 107,983 7.07 2.17 
    
Main activity, last 7 days:    
Paid work 67,381 0.67  
Unemployed 6,358 0.06  
Retired 7,708 0.07  
Housework, child rearing 10,544 0.10  
Education 11,533 10.68  
Community or military service 159 0.00  
Permanently sick or disabled 2,869 0.03  
    
Age 107,983 40.50 13.71 
Age squared 107,983 1828.57 1110.32 
Living with spouse/partner  66,966 0.62  
Subjective health (1-5) 107,983 3.93 0.85 
Years of full-time education 107,983 12.71 3.77 
Male  51,750 0.48  
Unemployment benefits main source 
of household income  
2,830 0.03  
Household income (1-12) 60,794 6.42 2.50 
    
Level 2 variables:    
Unemployment benefit generosity score 72 27.82 19.05 
ALMP expenditure per unemployed, % of gdp per capita 72 26.93 20.70 
PLMP expenditure per unemployed, % of gdp per capita 72 37.5 26.3 
Average net replacement rate 72 67.8 9.4 
Gdp per capita, constant prices in US $ (2000), ppp 72 26598.29 8779.04 
Social Expenditure as % of gdp 72 24.86 4.80 
Unemployment rate 72 7.08 3.52 
    
Notes: N refers to the number of nonmissising cases on the respective level, with the exception of 
dummy variables, where N refers to the cases in which X=1. For dummy variables, the mean shows 
the proportion of observations in which X=1.  
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misleading, so that no income variable 
can be inserted into models that use the 
full data sample. 
On the macro-level, aggregated coun-
try data covering the economic conditions 
and welfare state as well as labour market 
policy indicators are assembled. To meas-
ure the intensity of active labour market 
policy that the unemployed encounter, 
expenditure on ALMP per unemployed 
expressed as a percentage of the gdp per 
capita is calculated from OECD-data. It 
needs to be kept in mind that not all ac-
tivation effort applies to the unemployed, 
as certain services such as job counsel-
ling may be available to the employed or 
students as well. Despite this limitation, 
this measure should give an adequate ap-
proximation of the ALMP efforts per un-
employed. 
The operationalisation of the generos-
ity of unemployment benefit systems is 
more ambiguous. Most studies simply use 
the average net replacement rate of short-
term unemployment benefits. However, 
these replacement rates by the OECD (e.g. 
2007) do not account for other relevant 
aspects, that is, how long these benefits 
are paid and under what conditions. In 
fact, countries differ even more in the du-
ration of unemployment benefits than in 
their level. Therefore, Hasselpflug (2005) 
and Allard (2005) argue that indicators 
for the duration and the conditionality of 
unemployment benefits should be added. 
Hasselpflug (2005) provides data on the 
conditionality and duration of benefits 
and Allard (2005) combines OECD re-
placement rates with these indicators by 
Hasselpflug and the Ministry of Finance 
(1998) in Denmark to construct a so-
called 'net reservation wage'. It combines 
the generosity in terms of replacement 
rates and duration with the behavioural 
requirements that recipients have to fulfil. 
Yet, this indicator covers only the years up 
until 2003 and a limited country sample 
and even after extrapolation and updat-
ing, the number of observations remains 
limited. As the inclusion of conditionality 
hardly changes the generosity indicator 
as specified below (correlation coefficient 
of 0.97), models are estimated without the 
inclusion of a conditionality adjustment2.
Net replacement rates for unemployed 
persons (up to one year of unemployment) 
are taken from the OECD (2010). The re-
placement rates were averaged over the 
three family types and three income levels 
provided. To account for the duration of 
the unemployment benefit, an indicator 
that ranges between 0 (no benefit) and 
100 (unlimited duration or duration long-
er than 48 months) is inserted into the 
equation. Information was taken from the 
OECD 'Benefits and Wages' country spe-
cific files3. Replacement rates and dura-
tion are available for a rather large coun-
try sample and thus the main variable to 
measure benefit generosity is
2 Models including Allards so-called `net reser-
vation wage‘ are available from the author.
3 Available online: http://www.
oecd.org/document/29/0,3746,
en_2649_34637_39618653_1_1_1_1,00.html; 
last access June 7, 2012. Since the duration 
of benefits can and does vary with the age and 
employment record of the recipient, the recipi-
ent was assumed to be a 40 year old worker 
with an uninterrupted employment record. This 
is based on the practice by the OECD (e.g. 2007: 
17-22).
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Unemployment benefit generosity 
score = net 
replacement Rate* duration.
The indicator theoretically ranges be-
tween 0 (no benefits) and 100 (full income 
replacement for at least 48 months).
As a further operationalisation of un-
employment benefit generosity, expendi-
ture data on unemployment benefits per 
unemployed by the OECD, as a percent-
age of gdp per capita is used. From sim-
ple correlations with this passive labour 
market policy (PLMP) expenditure indica-
tor, it becomes obvious that replacement 
levels miss important aspects of the gen-
erosity of unemployment benefit systems: 
Average net replacement rates only show 
a correlation coefficient of 0.28, while the 
unemployment benefit generosity that 
accounts for the duration of benefits cor-
relates with the PLMP expenditure data 
by 0.68. Table 2 (p. 20) shows descriptive 
statistics for all labour market policy vari-
ables by country.
The bivariate relationship between 
the mean life satisfaction difference of 
employed and unemployed in a country 
and the respective unemployment gener-
osity score is depicted in graph 1 (p. 20). 
In order to allow readability of country la-
bels, graph 1b is a replication of graph 1a 
which is limited to observations from ESS 
round 1. The scatter plots show a negative 
correlation between life satisfaction and 
benefit generosity, suggesting that coun-
tries with generous unemployment ben-
efits tend to have lower life satisfaction 
differences between the employed and 
the unemployed. However, standard er-
rors appear to be rather large, suggesting 
that there are other important explanatory 
variables. As the bivariate plot takes nei-
ther socio-economic characteristics of the 
unemployed nor macro-indicators at the 
country-level into account, their inclusion 
may enhance the model fit substantially.
In addition to the labour market policy 
indicators, total social expenditure as a 
percentage of gdp as well as the unem-
ployment rate (ILO) and gdp per capita 
(in US $, constant prices adjusted for pur-
chasing power parity, OECD) were added 
as control variables on the macro level.
20  07/ 2012WORKING PAPERS
Graph 1: Mean life satisfaction differences (employed – unemployed) and benefit generosity 
by country
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Table 2: Labour market policy by country 
Country 
Level 
1 
Level 
2 
Average Net 
Replacement 
Rate 
Benefit 
Duration* 
Benefit 
Generosity 
ALMP 
expenditure 
PLMP  
expenditure 
 N N Mean Mean Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
AT 5671 3 64.6 20 13.1 0.1 28.2 2.3 61.2 2.7 
BE 5698 4 61.7 100 61.7 0.7 32.9 5.7 65.8 5.1 
CH 4669 3 80.0 22 17.2 7.7 32.2 3.5 41.1 7.0 
CZ 4648 3 65.1 13 8.1 0.1 7.1 2.8 7.6 1.4 
DE 8842 4 73.6 25 18.4 0.3 22.4 5.7 40.0 10.9 
DK 4830 4 73.4 100 73.4 1.0 70.1 8.8 85.6 11.9 
EE 2390 2 62.6 25 15.7 0.1 2.4 0.02 4.9 4.9 
ES 5811 4 69.1 50 34.5 0.1 15.5 2.4 31.3 2.8 
FI 6428 4 70.2 48 33.7 1.1 22.2 3.1 44.2 1.9 
FR 5720 4 74.6 48 35.7 0.2 26.0 2.8 39.5 4.0 
GB 6533 4 52.2 13 6.5 0.2 13.3 4.5 8.5 1.3 
HU 4787 4 61.5 19 11.5 1.6 12.7 6.0 13.3 2.1 
IE 5986 4 48.8 31 15.2 1.2 31.0 7.2 41.5 2.3 
IT 1174 1 61.3 13 7.7 . 19.0 . 21.4 . 
LU 2461 2 84.2 25 21.0 0.1 22.5 3.0 36.5 10.6 
NL 6197 4 72.5 48 41.7 11.7 75.9 28.4 97.0 22.7 
NO 4671 3 69.2 67 46.2 10.1 33.5 1.0 32.3 4.5 
PL 5979 4 58.9 25 14.7 0.6 7.9 6.7 11.9 0.9 
PT 5603 4 84.3 51 43.0 1.3 17.8 4.6 31.0 4.8 
SE 6156 4 70.3 29 20.5 1.3 40.4 12.4 29.0 11.5 
SK 3719 3 67.7 13 8.5 0.5 4.3 1.5 6.0 5.6 
Total 107973 72 67.8 40 27.8 19.1 26.9 20.7 37.5 26.3 
*In per cent of 48 months; for durations>48 months, the indicator is set equal to 100. 
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5. Regression Results & Interpretation
Table 3 and table 4 (p. 22, 23) report the 
regression results for the determinants of 
life satisfaction with the focus on labour 
market policy effects. Models (2) to (4) in 
table 3 show the interaction effects of un-
employment with almp expenditure and 
unemployment benefit generosity for the 
full data sample using random intercept 
models (MLM), while table 4 shows alter-
native model specifications as robustness 
tests. 
The inclusion of all four waves yields 
a fair amount of level 2 information, i.e. 
the macro-level number of observations 
is 72. However, using survey data from 
ESS round 4 inhibits the insertion of an 
income variable, as the survey question 
on household income deviates too drasti-
cally from former waves. As income has 
been shown to have a considerable influ-
ence on life satisfaction, results in table 
3 might be accused of suffering from a 
serious omitted variable bias. Therefore, 
model (5) shows the results of virtually 
the same model specification as model 
(4), but includes the household income 
measured in 12 income categories. As a 
result of dropping data from ESS round 4, 
the number of level 2 observations shrinks 
to 51. Next to pragmatic considerations 
of sample size and the prevention of an 
omitted variable bias, the comparison 
between models with and without house-
hold income variable may also offer ad-
ditional information regarding the content 
of a moderating effect of passive labour 
market policy. 
Furthermore, model (6) inserts coun-
try fixed effects with clustered standard 
errors at the country level to check wheth-
er changes in policies over time within 
countries have similar effects as cross-
country differences in policy designs. Fi-
nally, model (7) controls for a social norm 
effect (see Clark 2003) that might show in 
an interaction effect between unemploy-
ment and the unemployment rate and 
models (8) and (9) show different opera-
tionalisations of unemployment benefit 
generosity.
MoDERATIng EffECTS of 
LAboUR MARkET PoLICy on 
ThE LIfE SATISfACTIon 
EffECT of UnEMPLoyMEnT
The empirical analysis shows that na-
tional labour market policy has a major 
moderating influence on the effect be-
tween unemployment and life satisfac-
tion, with benefit generosity showing a 
more robust influence than the intensity 
of active labour market policy. In line with 
all previous literature, unemployment has 
a negative effect on life satisfaction in all 
countries in the sample. On average, un-
employment decreases life satisfaction by 
a full point on the 0-10 scale even after 
controlling for other personal characteris-
tics (model 1).
22  07/ 2012WORKING PAPERS
1
Table 3: Labour market policy and life satisfaction  
 
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction (1-10) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Level 1 Variables:         
Main activity (ref.: paid work)         
Unemployed -1.0*** (36.4) -1.4*** (29.8) -1.2*** (27.1) -1.4*** (28.1) 
Retired -0.04 (1.6) -0.04 (1.4) -0.04 (1.5) -0.04 (1.4) 
Housework, child rearing -0.04 (1.9) -0.04 (1.9) -0.04 (1.9) -0.04 (1.9) 
Education 0.2*** (6.6) 0.18*** (6.9) 0.2*** (6.9) 0.2*** (6.9) 
Community or military service -0.06 (0.4) -0.04 (0.3) -0.04 (0.3) -0.04 (0.3) 
Permanently sick or disabled -0.5*** (12.1) -0.5*** (12.0) -0.5*** (12.0) -0.5*** (12.1) 
         
Age -0.1*** (29.3) -0.1*** (29.1) -0.1*** (29.2) -0.1*** (29.1) 
Age squared 0.001*** (28.9) 0.001*** (28.6) 0.001*** (28.6) 0.001*** (28.6) 
Living with spouse/partner  0.6*** (45.7) 0.6*** (45.7) 0.6*** (46.0) 0.6*** (46.0) 
Subjective health (1-5) 0.7*** (86.9) 0.7*** (87.0) 0.7*** (87.0) 0.7*** (87.0) 
Years of full-time education 0.03*** (15.9) 0.03*** (15.3) 0.03*** (15.3) 0.03*** (15.3) 
Male  -0.1*** (8.8) -0.1*** (8.6) -0.1*** (8.8) -0.1*** (8.6) 
UE benefits main hh income  -0.5*** (13.6) -0.6*** (13.8) -0.6*** (13.8) -0.6*** (13.7) 
         
Level 2 Variables:         
ALMP expenditure   -0.001 (1.4) -0.001 (1.6) -0.001 (1.4) 
Unemployment benefit 
generosity 
  0.004* (2.3) 0.005* (2.5) 0.004* (2.3) 
Ln gdp per capita   -0.02 (0.1) -0.009 (0.1) -0.02 (0.1) 
Social Expenditure   -0.02** (2.7) -0.02** (2.8) -0.02** (2.7) 
Unemployment rate   -0.07*** (11.4) -0.06*** (11.3) -0.07*** (11.4) 
         
Interaction Effects (Level 1*Level 2)        
Unemployment*  
Unemployment benefit 
generosity 
  0.014*** (10.2)   0.014*** (8.5) 
Unemployment* ALMP 
expenditure 
    0.008*** (5.6) -
0.0001 
(0.1) 
         
Constant 5.8*** (36.3) 6.8*** (4.7) 6.7*** (4.6) 6.8*** (4.7) 
         
Method MLM  MLM  MLM  MLM  
Level 2 variance 0.41  0.35  0.35  0.35  
Level 1 variance 3.56  3.55  3.55  3.55  
ICC 0.10  0.09  0.09  0.09  
N micro 107973  107973  107973  107973  
N macro 72  72  72  72  
Notes: Absolute z-values in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; MLM: Multilevel Model; 
Random intercept specification; observations clustered at the country level; maximum likelihood 
estimation.
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Yet the severity of the life satisfaction 
effect of unemployment depends greatly 
on the generosity of the unemployment 
benefit system in a country. Hypothesis 1 
that predicts a positive moderating influ-
ence of unemployment benefit generos-
ity on the effect of unemployment on life 
satisfaction is strongly supported. The co-
efficient for benefit generosity ranges be-
tween 0.014 and 0.016 in all model speci-
fications. This effect is significant at the 
0.1 % level in all random intercept speci-
fications and proofs to be robust in the 
longitudinal fixed effects specifications at 
the 5 % or even 1 % significance level 
(model 6 and 7). As a further robustness 
test, the same models have been estimat-
ed for each wave of the European Social 
Survey separately4. The results prove to 
be robust across individual waves: In a 
specification corresponding to model (2), 
the interaction effect between unemploy-
ment and benefit generosity was positive 
and significant at least at the 5 % level in 
each ESS round. 
To be clear: Respondents living in a 
country with high replacement rates and 
long benefit receipt are still experienc-
ing a remarkable drop in their subjective 
well-being in case of job loss. However, 
the loss of life satisfaction is not nearly as 
dramatic as it is for an unemployed living 
in a country with low unemployment ben-
efit generosity. 
For instance, a person becoming un-
employed in a country with a benefit gen-
erosity score of one standard deviation 
above the mean experiences a drop in life 
satisfaction of -0.74 points on the 1-10 
4 Available upon request from the author.
scale. Given the same personal character-
istics, a respective respondent in a rather 
ungenerous country in terms of unem-
ployment benefits (unemployment benefit 
generosity score of 1 standard deviation 
below the mean) faces a considerably 
larger drop in life satisfaction of -1.285. 
Model (8) and (9) test different opera-
tionalisations for unemployment benefit 
generosity. While model (8) replaces the 
benefit generosity indicator by the aver-
age net replacement rate, model (9) uses 
expenditure data on passive labour mar-
ket policy. Both alternative operationalisa-
tions show similarly positive moderating 
effects on the life satisfaction of the un-
employed. However, the average replace-
ment rate appears to be less statistically 
significant than the two more encompass-
ing measures of benefit generosity, while 
the expenditure indicator shows strong 
positive moderating effects.
As mentioned above, the compari-
son between models that control for 
household income and models that lack 
an income variable can be a first step in 
understanding the mechanisms of a mod-
erating effect of labour market policy. If 
labour market policy lost its influence 
once income was controlled for, the mod-
erating effect of benefit generosity would 
have to be interpreted in a strict resource 
framework. An interaction effect that is 
unaffected by the inclusion of the income 
variable, however, suggests that passive 
labour market policy may affect the life 
satisfaction of the unemployed through 
5 Calculations based on the estimators 
in model (4), e.g. life satisfaction effect of 
unemployment in a rather generous country: 
-1.4+0.014*(27.82+19.05)=-0.74
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mechanisms that are not strictly pecuni-
ary. Without knowing the exact compo-
sition of the moderating effect, the esti-
mation results in model (5) suggest that, 
next to the resource dimension, labour 
market policy affects the unemployed in 
a non-pecuniary way. Unemployed in a 
country with rather encompassing unem-
ployment benefits may suffer from a less 
severe stigmatisation and thus loss of self-
confidence and life satisfaction than un-
employed in a country with extremely low 
generosity scores. This argument is in line 
with previous research that hints towards 
negative psychosocial effects of means-
tested social assistance benefit receipt 
(Wulfgramm 2011: 495) in case of expired 
unemployment benefit entitlements. 
The moderating effect of active la-
bour market policy with respect to unem-
ployment and life satisfaction is far less 
straightforward and robust than the effect 
of passive labour market policy. If an in-
teraction effect of unemployment*active 
labour market expenditure per unem-
ployed is added to the model specifica-
tion, a moderating effect of active labour 
market policy shows (model 3). This 
would suggest that the life satisfaction 
effect of unemployment in a country with 
low activation effort (one standard devia-
tion below the mean) is -1.15, while it is 
only -0.81 in a more generous country. 
However, the addition of the interaction 
effect of unemployment*benefit gener-
osity offsets this positive interaction ef-
fect completely. If passive labour mar-
ket policy is controlled for, active labour 
market policy does not appear to matter 
in the determination of life satisfaction 
of the unemployed. Hence, Hypothesis 
2 cannot be confirmed robustly. This re-
sult comes as surprise given the positive 
treatment effects of certain active labour 
market policy measures in countries such 
as Germany, Sweden or the United King-
dom (Wulfgramm 2011; Strandh 2001; 
Andersen 2008) and the positive effect of 
ALMP expenditure on social ties of labour 
market outsiders (Anderson 2009)6. 
The control variables on the micro-
level behave in a rather predictable fash-
ion and are in line with most happiness 
literature. Among the main occupations, 
being a student sticks out as having a 
more positive effect than working, while 
being permanently sick or disabled is as-
sociated with a significantly lower level of 
life satisfaction. For age, the well-known 
u-curve emerges, with the lowest level 
of life satisfaction at an average age of 
42 years. Moreover, being educated and 
healthy increases life satisfaction, while 
being male and depending on unem-
ployment benefits as the main source 
of household income affects well-being 
negatively.
The comparison of the impact of the 
income variable on the micro-level with 
the non-existent influence of national 
wealth of a country complies surpris-
ingly well with the Easterlin paradox (cf. 
Easterlin 2001): While earning and own-
ing more than others satisfies individuals, 
economic development does not alter the 
average life satisfaction within a country 
once a certain threshold is reached. As all 
countries in the sample have a gdp per 
6 It should be noted that Anderson did not con-
trol for passive labour market policy, though, so 
that his positive effects may suffer from omitted 
variable bias.
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capita of more than 10,000 US $ per year, 
differences in average life satisfaction be-
tween countries cannot be attributed to 
the level of economic development. More-
over, it has been tested whether life satis-
faction varies with time, especially as the 
last wave of the ESS has been conducted 
during the crisis years 2008/2009. Indeed, 
life satisfaction is smaller by 0.18 points 
in the ess-round 4 compared to essround 
1 even after controlling for socioeconomic 
conditions (results not shown). Other co-
efficients are virtually unaffected by the 
inclusion of wave-dummies, though.
The macro-level control variables of-
fer somewhat more puzzling coefficients. 
While the large negative impact of the un-
employment rate complies with general 
expectations and previous research on 
contextual effects of unemployment (e.g. 
Faas 2010), the effects of the three wel-
fare state variables are less intuitive. Both 
coefficients of ALMP expenditure as well 
as social expenditure show slightly nega-
tive tendencies, while unemployment 
benefit generosity has a somewhat posi-
tive effect on life satisfaction. Significance 
levels remain rather modest and tend to 
be highly sensitive to the model specifica-
tion, though.
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6. Conclusion
European welfare states differ widely in 
their approaches to alleviate the situation 
of the unemployed, yet the general trend 
of the past two decades has shown an ‘ac-
tivation turn’ in European labour market 
policy. This paradigm shift has led to an 
increasingly high commitment towards 
active labour market policy, while unem-
ployment benefits tend to have developed 
in a rather restrictive fashion with respect 
to their level, duration and conditional-
ity. Both these enabling and enforcing 
elements of labour market activation are 
supposed to increase the reemployment 
of the unemployed. Yet such changes in 
public policies generally entail more than 
just the intended effects. I argue that the 
lives of individuals that are highly depend-
ent on welfare state support are affected 
by public policies in ways that go beyond 
the economic effects that are generally 
studied in policy analyses. When it comes 
to life satisfaction effects, little is known 
about the interaction between adverse 
life events such as unemployment and the 
welfare state pillars that are supposed to 
cover these risks. 
As the life of the unemployed is large-
ly framed by national design and gener-
osity of unemployment benefits as well 
as active labour market policy, the core 
hypotheses in this paper predicted posi-
tive moderating effects of generous la-
bour market policies on life satisfaction 
of the unemployed. Indeed, this paper 
has shown that the well-being of the un-
employed is to a surprisingly large extent 
determined by labour market policy. The 
effect of unemployment on life satisfac-
tion differs considerably between Euro-
pean countries and depends strongly on 
the generosity of unemployment benefits. 
Restrictive benefit systems with short 
benefit durations and low benefit levels 
increase the psychosocial burden of un-
employment for the respondents and are 
thus connected to a far larger drop in life 
satisfaction than the respective negative 
effect of unemployment in countries with 
rather generous passive labour market 
policy. It is shown that this effect remains 
strong even after the individual income 
of respondents is controlled for. There-
fore I argue that this moderating effect 
of unemployment benefit generosity acts 
through both a resource and a non-pecu-
niary mechanism, where the latter is due 
to the fact that labour market policy may 
contribute to the stigmatization of unem-
ployment.
However, not all results are in line 
with expectations. The prediction that 
spending on active labour market policy 
will have a moderating effect on the life 
satisfaction effect of unemployment could 
not be confirmed robustly. While a mod-
erating effect appears in the analysis of a 
limited model specification, this connec-
tion disappears once unemployment ben-
efit generosity is controlled for. A possible 
cause for the missing connection may 
be the simplified assumption that ALMP 
always has an enabling character, while 
different types of active measures may 
actually have very different well-being 
implications. The aggregation of ALMP 
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spending may thus blur the effect of 
specific policies. Future research should 
therefore investigate whether the type 
of ALMP efforts affects the well-being of 
the unemployed. Furthermore, more light 
should be shed on the interplay between 
active and passive labour market policy in 
the determination of the life satisfaction 
effect of unemployment. 
A final word needs to be said about 
the importance of incorporating well-
being effects into the evaluation of labour 
market policy. It might be argued that a 
focus on the effect of labour market policy 
on reemployment already covers well-
being aspects, as reemployment has been 
shown to be connected to a sharp rise in 
life satisfaction. While the reintegration 
into paid employment is most certainly 
the major aim of activation, this kind of 
argumentation ignores the reality of Euro-
pean labour markets with unemployment 
rates of up to 20 per cent. As long as acti-
vation fails to combat unemployment suc-
cessfully, a concern for the quality of life 
of the unemployed touches upon the core 
function of the welfare state, i.e. inclusion 
and support of the worst-off. 
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Seit einigen Jahren steht „die Krise“ (der Finanzmärkte, des Euro, der Staatss-
chulden) im Zentrum der öffentlichen Diskussion. Waren  die zunächst einge-
tretenen (kurzfristigen) Effekte für die deutsche Wirtschaft und die Alters-
sicherungssysteme – insbesondere im Vergleich zu vielen anderen Ländern 
– moderat, so ist in mittel- und längerfristiger Perspektive mit beträchtli-
chen Auswirkungen zu rechnen. Diese werden nicht nur von ökonomischen 
Entwicklungen sowie von Entscheidungen auf nationaler Ebene bestimmt, 
sondern zunehmend auch von Entwicklungen auf der europäischen Ebene. 
Erkennbar ist u.a., dass nach dem gezielten Unterminieren des Vertrauens 
in umlagefinanzierte Alterssicherung, ein Vertrauensschwund  auch für kapi-
talmarktabhängige Alterssicherung eingetreten ist. Besondere Probleme für 
die Alterssicherung werfen ein niedriges Zinsniveau und Inflationsrisiken auf. 
Angesichts der sprunghaft gestiegenen Staatsschulden ist mit steigendem 
Druck auf öffentliche Alterssicherung zu rechnen, auch durch europäische 
Institutionen. Dort stehen fiskalische Nachhaltigkeit und Armutsvermeidung 
im Zentrum. Insgesamt liegt der Schluß nahe, dass die Finanzmarktkrise die 
Entwicklung,  die in der deutschen Alterssicherungspolitik seit einigen Jahren 
beschritten wird, noch beschleunigen dürfte. Die damit verbundenen prob-
lematischen sozial- und verteilungspolitischen Wirkungen gehen zudem ein-
her mit zunehmender Verunsicherung der Bevölkerung.
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